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In this paper, we analyze the interactions between growth and the contracting environment
in the production sector. Allowing incompleteness in contracting implies that viable produc-
tion relationships for ¯rms and workers, and therefore the pro¯tability of industries, depend
on the rates of innovation and growth. The speed at which new innovations arrive in turn
depends on the pro¯tability of production, for the usual reasons examined in the endogenous
growth literature. We show that these interactions can have important implications which are
consistent with observed phenomena in both the micro and macro environment. In particular,
we demonstrate that a technological shock (increasing productivity of research) can, through
this interaction, lead to a productivity slowdown and a shift in labor market contracts away
from ¯rms providing implicit guarantees of lifetime employment and towards shorter-term
\contractor" type arrangements. We show the consistency of an increase in the proportion
of the labor force under short term employment, increased relative returns of workers in high
productivity sectors, and increased income inequality, with a productivity slowdown of ¯nite
duration.
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11 Introduction
Endogenous growth theory suggests that the pro¯tability of productive relationships matters for
the rate of innovation, and therefore for sustaining growth. Innovation is encouraged when ¯rms
can successfully extract much of the surplus associated with a worker's e®ort, that is, when ¯rms
can obtain a rent from their ownership and use of a technology. In this way, innovation, and thus
growth, are directly related to the feasible set of worker-¯rm relationships or contracts. Standard
technology-based endogenous growth models abstract from this issue by implicitly assuming com-
plete contracting in production.1 Here, we explicitly model contracts as incomplete, and therefore
we endogenously determine the form of worker-¯rm relationships. Not only do the feasible set of
relationships determine the pro¯tability of innovating ¯rms and therefore the rate of growth, but
it is also the case that macroeconomic variables determine which contracts can be o®ered in the
economy. Speci¯cally, the rates of innovation and growth a®ect the surplus to and the duration
of relationships, and thus determine the set of feasible contracts.
We consider an environment where ¯rms and workers cannot explicitly contract over worker
e®ort in production, and analyze the form of \relational contracts" in their repeated interaction
that will support a productive relationship.2 One possible form of relational contract is for
the ¯rm to reward workers with delayed bene¯ts that are paid only once the worker's e®ort is
ascertained by the ¯rm. We refer to such a relational contract as an \internal labor market" and
its existence depends critically on the ¯rm's valuation of its reputation. This, however, depends
on the ¯rm's expected life-time. In an environment with high potential growth and rapid ¯rm
turnover, ¯rms cannot make credible promises of delayed reward to workers, so the internal labor
market is necessarily limited. This is the sense in which the macroeconomy constrains feasible
micro level contracts. On the other hand, incentives to innovate, and hence the economy's growth
rate, depend on the returns in production, which are lower when labor costs are high, that is,
when the internal labor market is limited. Thus, micro level contracting relationships also a®ect
the macro environment.
Formally, we augment a standard Schumpeterian growth model, as in Grossman and Help-
man (1991 Ch. 4) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), with incomplete contracting in production.
We exclude the possibility of legally enforceable payments for worker e®ort, and consider only
those e®ort/wage pairs that are self-enforcing. It has been widely argued that the non-veri¯able
particulars of a worker/¯rm relationship do not allow for explicit contracting over payments that
are contingent upon worker performance (see Macleod and Malcomson 1989). In such a frame-
1This contrasts with the more careful modelling of production relationships in both industrial organization and
labor economics, where production under incomplete contracting has been more thoroughly examined. For surveys,
see Hart (1995), Gibbons (1997) and Malcomson (1999).
2The term \relational contract" has been used by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1997) to denote these sorts of
implicit contracts, a special case of these have also been called \e±ciency wage" contracts. These are discussed,
and the related literature is reviewed in Malcomson (1999).
1work, only self-enforcing payments and e®ort will be supplied in equilibrium. With su±cient
surplus to production arrangements, however, it is well known that a multiplicity of self-enforcing
wage/e®ort pairs is possible. It is in the creation of a surplus that innovation a®ects contracting.
In an endogenous growth context, the surpluses required to sustain production arise naturally
as the rewards to successful innovative activity. Thus, in our environment, monopoly pro¯ts to
innovation serve two roles: in addition to the standard role of providing incentives for innovation
they serve to provide su±cient surplus so that performance contingent implicit contracts can be
self-enforcing.
These two roles of ¯rm pro¯ts are potentially con°icting: a relationship-destroying role and a
relationship-sustaining role. First, as in any standard endogenous growth model, ¯rm pro¯ts mo-
tivate innovation: this innovation destroys the market power of current monopolists and destroys
their relationships with their workers.3 Second, in a model with incomplete contracting, ¯rm rents
allow a ¯rm to develop a reputation for honoring its promises to its workers. In this way, they are
a force that sustains worker-¯rm relationships. Here, these two roles introduce a tension { high
¯rm pro¯ts sustain relationships through ¯rm commitment and destroy relationships through
encouraging rapid innovation. The introduction of this tension has important implications for
the economy's contracting structure and ultimately for the rate of growth. To illustrate this, we
use this model to o®er an alternative theory of the productivity slowdown: a theory which is
consistent with the marked changes in labor market relationships that were coincident with the
observed slowdown in productivity.4
This model suggests an explanation for a set of macroeconomic changes which, though di±-
cult to date precisely, seemed to begin in the early 1970s. These were: (1) the IT revolution,5
(2) the productivity slowdown,6 and (3) the commencement of the erosion of internal labor
markets.7 The information technology (IT) revolution initiated a period of high productivity
3The standard notion of `creative destruction' refers to this ¯rst e®ect, destroying the market power of the
existing monopolist. Here, we highlight this second type of destruction: worker-¯rm relationship destruction.
4Our explanation resembles previous attempts to explain the slowdown by labor market induced changes in
innovation, or in the dissemination and implementation of new technology, i.e., Hornstein and Krusell (1996),
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Lloyd-Ellis (1999). However, since these approaches do not include a role
for contracting at the micro level, they are clearly structurally very di®erent to the one we present. We contrast
these results with ours in the discussion section of the paper.
5Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) date the IT revolution to the early 1970's.
6Since the early 1970s there has been a secular decline in the rate of productivity growth (both labor and total
f a c t o r )i nm a n yw e s t e r nd e v e l o p e de c o n o m i e s .F o c u s i n go nt h eU S ,f r o mat r e n dr a t eo fa p p r o x i m a t e l y2 . 2 %f r o m
1950-1972, the rate of labor productivity growth (excluding agriculture) declined to about 1% from 1972 to 1987
and 1.2% from 1987 to 1994. Over the late 1990's growth in labour productivity has increased once again, from
1995-1999 output per hour in non-farm business grew at an average annual rate of 2.5%, see Oliner and Sichel
(2000). Dolmas, Raj and Slottje (1999) show that the log level of productivity underwent a change in both level
and slope of its linear trend in the 1970s. There has been some debate as the reliability of measured productivity
growth in the light of the emergence of new sectors, but even adjusted estimates taking this into account, ¯nd a
persistent slowdown over the relevant period, see for example R. Gordon (1996).
7There has been a large increase in the number of contingent workers, or those working without an expectation
of ongoing employment. Recent estimates put the numbers in such positions at 12 million workers or over 10%
2of inventive e®ort. Ultimately, however, the returns to inventive e®ort depend on the degree to
which this productivity can be pro¯ted from. This, in turn, depends on the form of contracting
relationships between ¯rms and employees, since employees will have to be hired to use the new
technologies that are developed. Prior to the slowdown, these contracting relationships could
best be characterized as an internal labor market;8 ¯rms rewarded workers with deferred bene¯ts
and were themselves disciplined to provide these rewards by their own labor market reputations.
The increased innovative potential accompanying the IT revolution implied more rapid turnover
in best-practice productive arrangements. These eventually reached a point (which may have
di®ered by sector) where ¯rms' labor market reputations provided insu±cient discipline for the
maintenance of the internal labor market. Therefore, as the IT revolution worked its way through
the economy, within-industry labor markets underwent a fundamental change from being internal
labor markets to what we term \contractor"-based labor markets. In a contractor labor market,
the moral hazard is not borne by the employer but by labor, who are disciplined by their own
reputations to provide e®ort. This leads to a shift in the distribution of returns away from ¯rms
towards labor since, as has already been realized in the theoretical literature, see Macleod and
Malcomson (1989), incentive compatibility requires that the party standing to gain from oppor-
tunistic behavior must receive a surplus to continued honest participation. Each industry where
the labor market undergoes such a restructuring experiences an industry wide decline in returns
to innovation which o®sets the potential productivity gains from the IT revolution. Thus, over
this phase, the induced changes in the labor market heralded in by the IT revolution lead to
the seemingly paradoxical possibility of lower productivity growth while the raw productivity of
labor in research rises.9
There is already a large literature exploring the macroeconomic implications of microeconomic
models of the employment relationship, in particular with respect to aggregate employment levels,
(Macleod, Malcomson and Gomme 1994, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), and job destruction over the
cycle, (Ramey and Watson 1997, Caballero and Hammour 1996). A close precursor of this work is
Aghion and Howitt (1994), which explores causation from growth rates to unemployment through
of the US labor force, see Cohany (1996). Approximately 8.3 million of the 12 million workers in non-traditional
arrangements are independent contractors, 75% of whom work alone. There is no evidence that the increase in
their numbers is attributable to employers cutting costs; rates of pay for independent contractors in business service
¯rms are comparable to or higher than rates of pay to the permanent employees, (Abraham 1990, p. 102). These
are generally relatively highly educated and highly paid individuals who experience considerable job satisfaction,
see Cohany (1996, p. 35). This growth in contract work has been discussed by Segal and Sullivan (1997) and
Abraham and Taylor (1996). Amongst these predominately white collar workers there has been a considerable
decline in job security. As presented in Aaronson and Sullivan (1998), surveys of worker perceptions of job security
in the General Social Survey, spanning 1977-1996, carried out by the National Opinion Research Center show that
white collar and college educated workers experienced substantial increases in job insecurity in the 1990s.
8An internal labor market contract would be closely associated with something referred to as `a lifetime contract'
in the media.
9Information possessing capacity, or the IT revolution can be thought of as a general purpose technology, which
is how we model it. However nothing in the model requires that it be `general' in fact the results will obtain if
di®erent sectors are a®ected to di®ering degrees.
3the destructive e®ects of new knowledge on existing job matches. At a theoretical level, Ramey
and Watson (1997) also related the feasibility of the incomplete contracting relationship and its
vulnerability to aggregate downturns. A major di®erence is that their work is concerned with
cyclical aspects of this relationship and they do not explore the reverse direction of e®ect of micro
contracting on the macroeconomy. The present paper is the ¯rst, to our knowledge, to explore
the e®ects of the macro environment (in particular the innovation arrival, and hence growth, rate)
on the possibility for contracting at the micro level, and also to explore the reverse causation of
contracting at the micro level's e®ects on growth.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model. This is largely
a standard Schumpeterian model of growth except that we allow for incomplete contracting in
production. The severity of this contracting problem will be seen to vary with the expected
productive lives of ¯rms. We introduce sectoral heterogeneity, so that these lifetimes may vary
across industries. Section 3 considers the steady state implications of the model. After establish-
ing existence, we consider the e®ect of an exogenous increase in the productivity of research when
this does not a®ect the contracting environment. It is then demonstrated that the contracting
structure cannot remain impervious to su±ciently large increases in research productivity. The
endogenous changes in contracting structure are shown to lead to the possibility of a growth
slowdown. The model is simulated for reasonable parameter values in order to assess the likeli-
hood of such a slowdown. We then brie°y examine the model's implications for changes occuring
elsewhere with the slowdown. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
Our analysis closely follows that of Aghion and Howitt's (1992) and Grossman and Helpman's
(1991, Ch. 4) Schumpeterian models of growth through creative destruction. The numeraire ¯nal
good y(t) is produced by using intermediate goods, xj (t); that are distributed uniformly over an





These intermediate good industries are further di®erentiated into M types or sectors each of
measure 1, where these sectors are indexed by m: Sectors are di®erentiated by the step size in
the quality ladder, °m; which represents the size of an incremental improvement or innovation
in one of the industries in sector m. Without loss of generality, we order these sectors such that
m<m+1 implies °m <° m+1: Further, we assume that the di®erence in step size across sectors
is uniform. Speci¯cally, the sector with smallest step size has a step of °1 = °>1; the next
smallest has step size °2 = A°,w h e r eA>1; and the mth sector has step size, °m = Am¡1°; up
to the sector with the highest step size, sector M; with size °M = AM¡1°: Figure 1 displays the
4s t r u c t u r eo fs t e ps i z e sb ys e c t o r .A ni n d u s t r yi sap o i n to nt h eu n i ti n t e r v a ll o c a t e dw i t h i no n eo f
t h e s es e c t o r s .W eu s et h en o t a t i o nm 2f 1;:::;Mg to denote sectors, and j 2 [0;M]t od e n o t e
industries.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Let a measure N ¸ 1 denote the amount of human capital in the economy. Each worker can
be thought of as possessing a unit of human capital. These workers are endogenously allocated
between research and production such that, during any period t; there are L(t) production workers
and S (t) research workers which in aggregate must respect the economy's resource endowment:
L(t)+S (t) · N: (2)
Since our interest is in productivity growth, we focus on the allocation of that portion of the
economy's labor stock with enough human capital to contribute to growth{generating activities
(which we term research). We ignore other potential inputs, such as unskilled labor, and assume
that all human capital in the model is perfectly substitutable between production and research.10
Intermediate industries are operated by monopolists using human capital as the only input
in a constant returns to scale production process. At any time, the current monopolist in an
industry is the ¯rm which has developed the state of the art production technique, over which
it has patent protection. Thus, if at time t t h e r eh a v eb e e nnj(t) innovations in industry j; the




j Lj (t): (3)





; where wj(t)i st h e
wage paid in industry j by the incumbent monopolist. Since labor is homogeneous, substitutable
and freely mobile across industries, we denote the market clearing wage in period t by w(t);
without the subscript j; since it will not re°ect industry level technologies: Of course, this is
endogenously solved for in steady state.11







As a result, monopolists wish to set the price of intermediate goods as high as possible. However
they are constrained in their price setting by the redundant technology which, although strictly
10We thereby abstract from issues of human capital accumulation and ability-biased technological change that
may lead to a slowdown through di®erent channels as in Galor and Moav (1999), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), and
Helpman and Rangel (1999).
11The reason we distinguish between wj (t)a n dw(t) in notation is that, as will be seen, depending on the nature
of contracts that are enforceable at the micro level, monopolists may have to pay a premium to workers over the













Figure 1. Step Size by Sectorless productive than their own and thus of zero value in equilibrium, is freely available to potential
entrants. This threat of entry constrains the monopolist's price setting. As is standard (see, for
example, Grossman and Helpman (1991)), we assume the threat of entry remains; so that, the
monopolist must limit price at the marginal cost of production for a potential producer who were
to enter using the previous technology. Only at this price (or lower) are entrants guaranteed







Therefore, the monopolist in industry j earns per period pro¯t of:

















































Individual consumer/workers are assumed to have isoelastic utility which depends only on their
consumption of the ¯nal good.12 There is a common discount factor, ½; and each individual has a
per period probability of dying 1¡±, in which case they obtain utility 0 from then on. A currently










1¡¾ is an individual's intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Workers are replaced when
















12A worker's one unit of human capital is supplied inelastically so that, for simplicity, we do not factor it into the
utility calculation. Note that even though moral hazard in e®ort is a critical feature of the problem in production,
shirking does not involve substituting leisure for e®ort in our framework, since leisure generates no bene¯ts. Moral
hazard instead concerns the allocation of that inelastically supplied e®ort. This is made clear in section 2.3.
6The net present value of expected lifetime consumption must be weakly less than the net present
value of the consumer's asset stream, B (t); and the net present value of expected lifetime earnings,
where r(¿) denotes the risk free interest rate on ¯nal output that is lent for one period.13 In







Note that a necessary and su±cient condition for the consumer's utility to be bounded and




¾ < 1: (9)
2.1 Innovation problem
Innovations of higher quality are produced by researchers. Let Sj (t) denote the total number
of researchers in industry j at time t: We assume the innovation technology generates an arrival
probability with constant returns to scale in aggregate research, and therefore let ®Sj (t)b e
the probability of an innovation arriving in industry j in period t; where the parameter ® is a
productivity parameter which we vary later to re°ect changes in technological opportunities or
innovative productivity: Innovations arriving during any given period are implemented at the
start of the following period. We assume that each unit of the measure Sj (t) total has an equal
probability of being the one that realizes the innovation.15
There is free entry into research activities. At the start of each period, research entrepreneurs
hire human capital to undertake research in a given sector and ¯nance these research e®orts by
selling equity shares to the consumers.16 Researchers enter until expected returns from research
13Note that there is no capital in this model, but as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), the asset market simply
trades claims to ¯nal output across periods, and r adjusts to equalize supply and demand for those claims in
aggregate.
14This condition comes from considering the net present value of a consumer's consumption stream in a steady



























15To avoid modelling the interaction between multiple innovators within a single period, we assume that innova-
tors can observe the e®orts of others in their own sector but not the outcomes of others' innovations until after they
are implemented in production. Thus, at the start of each period, innovative e®ort commences in each industry,
after a single innovation arrives, research stops, since a further research success will yield for the innovator only
zero pro¯t, due to the Bertrand interaction. Note also that, since Sj (t) is allocated to research over a discrete
time interval, the probability of an innovation ®Sj (t) does not re°ect the probability of an instantaneous arrival
using the Poisson distribution, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991). Instead the arrival probability ®Sj (t)h e r ei s
determined as 1 minus the probability of 0 innovations in the period using a binomial distribution.
16An equity share in research undertaken in industry j entitles the holder to a claim on pro¯ts arising from
research undertaken in industry j. Since innovation successes are independent across industries, optimal trading
of equity shares will lead to complete diversi¯cation of equity holdings over all industries.
7equal opportunity costs of human capital in production. Letting Vj (t + 1) be the lifetime ex-
pected value of a successful innovation occuring in period t,a n dr(t) denote the interest rate for
discounting from t to t +1 ; market clearing in research implies:
®Vj (t +1 )
(1 + r(t))
· w(t): (10)
Condition (10) holds with equality when there is a positive level of research in an industry: In
steady state (as will be seen), per period pro¯t grows at a constant rate (so that ¼j(t +1 )=
(1+g)¼j(t) for all t) and the interest rate is constant (r(t)=r for all t) implying we can rewrite





:17 The stream of pro¯ts are discounted by not only r;
but also by the expected future innovation rate, ®Sj. As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), this
additional discount arises due to the possibility of a future innovator succeeding and usurping
the incumbent's leading position (a creative destruction e®ect).
In steady state where there is positive research in sector j, Sj will solve
®¼j (t +1 )
1+r ¡ (1 ¡ ®Sj)(1 + g)
= wj (t): (11)
The value of per period pro¯ts, ¼j (t); depend critically on the industry{speci¯c wage bill
and hence on contracting at the micro level, so we leave this until the next section. However it
is possible to compute the economy wide growth implications of a given level of research in each
industry, Sj: Even though each industry experiences growth probabilistically, since each sector is
a unit density of industries, sectors have non-stochastic growth rates. Thus, given the allocations





17This is computed as follows:
Vj (t +1 )=¼j (t +1 )+
1





(1 ¡ ®Sj (t + 1))(1 ¡ ®Sj (t +2 ) )¼j (t +3 )+::::
= ¼j (t +1 )+
1+g






2 ¼j (t +1 )+::::
Provided that (1 ¡ ®Sj)
(1+g)






the consumer's Euler condition (1 + r)=
(1+½)(1+g)1¡¾
± ; the condition required for the in¯nite stream of pro¯ts to
be bounded yields
±
(1+½) (1 + g)
¾ (1 ¡ ®Sj) < 1; and condition (9) implies that this always holds:
18To derive this: g =l n y (t +1 )¡ lny (t): From the production function: lny (t)=
R M

















































j dj: Substituting in that the probability of an innovation arriving in an
industry equals ®Sj yields: g =
R M
0 [nj (t)+®Sj ¡ 1]ln°jdj ¡
R M
0 [nj (t) ¡ 1]ln°jdj: Notice that in each industry
we substituted in the expected number of innovation successes. This is correct since we have a unit measure of all
industries j 2 m; for which Sj = Sm for all m: Thus, by applying the law of large numbers on the unit interval, we




We assume that there is moral hazard in production and incomplete contracting. We model
the contracting problem in a parsimonious way so that the standard Schumpeterian framework
of growth in the macro economy can still be solved in closed form. A particularly simple form
of contractual incompleteness is to assume a worker's output is non-observable to third parties,
but known to both the worker and the ¯rm after a lag of one period. This is the form of
incompleteness analyzed in Macleod and Malcomson (1989), who were the ¯rst to provide a
proper game theoretic foundation for an earlier literature in labor economics concerned with
contracting incompleteness.19
Unlike the standard principal-agent model, the third party non-veri¯ability precludes the
use of contracts linking worker payment to output produced. We assume that this contracting
incompleteness only occurs in intermediate production, not in the research sector.20 Formally,
contracting incompleteness arises due to information limitations as follows.
INFORMATION AND TIMING:
Public information: All workers and ¯rms know the identity of employers and their employees,
in all previous periods. The particulars of the worker/¯rm relationship, in particular whether
promised deferred payments are made by the ¯rm, or promised e®ort is supplied by the worker,
are not known publically. If a worker dies or a ¯rm no longer holds the state of the art technology,
this is also public information.
Worker's private information: At each period t; a worker knows her own wage payments,
w(¿) for all previous periods ¿<t ;and her own work performance for all periods ¿<t :In
addition, she knows whether ¯rms in which she was employed in any period ¿<tdelivered any
promised deferred payments to her.
Firm's private information:A t e a c h p e r i o d t; a ¯rm knows the history of wage payments
made to all of its past workers by it in all periods ¿<t :It also knows the e®ort contributed by
all its employees in previous periods while they were employed with the ¯rm:
An e w¯ r mo rw o r k e ri np e r i o dt has no private information, but has full access to all public
information.
Within a period, the time line of events is as follows: At the start of a period a worker and
a ¯rm holding a valuable technology implicitly contract. As will be seen, such contracts involve
19This literature was concerned with \e±ciency wage" contracts, see for example (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
Carmichael (1985), Bull (1987)).
20It would also be natural to add contracting incompleteness to the research sector since this is at least as likely
to be subject to moral hazard as production. We have not done this since the e®ects would not di®er qualitatively
from those in the simpler version of the model we follow here. However note that in the present version there is
no expected rent obtained by the research entrepreneurs but, with incomplete contracts, rents play an important
role in supporting incentive compatibility. Thus, with incomplete contracting in research, the market clearing in
research condition, condition (10), would hold with a strict inequality, and would therefore admit less research
e®ort. However, the qualitative results we obtain concerning changes in the steady state would be unaltered.
9either the ¯rm making an up front payment before e®ort is contributed to production by the
worker, or the worker contributing e®ort before the ¯rm makes a deferred payment. Thus, the
timing is: (1) the ¯rm chooses whether or not to pay up front; (2) then the worker chooses
whether or not to contribute e®ort to production; (3) e®ort is inferred by the ¯rm; (4) the ¯rm
chooses whether or not to pay any promised deferred payments; (5) both players, being aware
of each other's actions during the period, choose independently whether to continue for another
period or terminate the relationship. If either one chooses to terminate, the relationship ends;
(6) the period ends and the worker continues to the next period with probability ±; and the ¯rm
continues to be the holder of a valuable technology (and thus to remain in existence) with a
probability that is to be endogenously determined. This time line is summarized in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2
A worker's e®ort contribution in period t is not known by the ¯rm in which it is employed
until later in the period, and never veri¯able.21 Since contracts can only be written on veri¯able,
and hence public, information, it is not possible to write a contract tying a worker's payment to
their e®ort contribution at a particular ¯rm. In general, the assumption that there is no third
party veri¯ability by the courts must then be accompanied by an assumption that other agents
are also not able to verify the reasons for a termination, except when one of the parties \dies".
As Macleod and Malcomson (1989) argue, this is a reasonable way to characterize an employment
relationship. For example, even if the actual act of \¯ring" is observable, it cannot be inferred
with certainty that the ¯rm has violated the employment contract. The ¯rm may have ¯red the
worker for an unconscionable lack of e®ort. In that case, it was worker shirking that precipitated
dismissal, and not the ¯rm violating an implicit agreement of job security. Similarly a \quit" by a
worker does not imply the worker broke an implicit agreement of continuation since the ¯rm may
have made conditions unbearable for the worker. In that case, it was the ¯rm who violated the
implicit contract. The general point is that without observing the actual actions undertaken by
¯rms and workers, third parties cannot infer violations of promised behaviour just by observing
a termination in the relationship. Thus, when they do observe the termination of a relationship,
their beliefs, which must be consistent with the equilibrium strategies of all agents, play a critical
role. Malcomson (1999) discusses the advantages of such an approach to analyzing real-world
employment relationships, and provides a survey of this literature.
In general, there are two types of implicit contract (sometimes also termed relational contracts)
that can solve the incomplete contracting problem and yield incentive compatible self{enforcing
contracts: one allows for the worker to be subject to moral hazard in e®ort, and the other allows
21This is the reason why we model time as discrete in contrast to, for example, the Schumpeterian framework
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991). With production in continuous time, the cost of non-observability
until the end of the production period becomes negligible.


































Prob. endogenousfor the ¯rm to be subject to moral hazard in payment. We shall refer to the ¯rst case as that
of \contractors"; and the second case as an \internal labor market". Both sorts of self-enforcing
contracts involve play by agents that would not constitute Nash equilibria in a one shot meeting,
but which are supported as equilibria of the continuation game when agents have high enough
valuations of the future.
2.3 The contractor case
When ¯rms hire contractors, the moral hazard problem resides with the workers. These workers
contract their labor services to the ¯rm on a per period basis. The contractual relationship
speci¯es a payment to the contractor, which is made by the ¯rm at the start of the period; and
hence before the contractor's e®ort has been applied to production, and before the ¯rm knows
e®ort. Later in the period, after the ¯rm observes the correct e®ort was exerted, the implicit
contract speci¯es the ¯rm will choose to re-hire the contractor for the next period, under the same
sort of implicit contract. If the correct e®ort is not exerted, the ¯rm terminates the relationship.22
Since e®ort cannot be inferred by the ¯rm until later in the period, nothing stops the worker from
contributing insu±cient e®ort in the ¯rm, and obtaining returns to her e®ort elsewhere. Since we
do not model individual labor supply decisions here (individuals inelastically supply one unit of
labor each period and utility is not a function of leisure), such shirking by a contractor does not
involve consuming leisure, but instead involves obtaining the opportunity cost of labor supplied
to its best alternative use. This is the market wage w(t):23 It is the value of the contractor's
reputation, the potential for future above{market clearing returns, that provides incentives to
contribute the promised e®ort in equilibrium.
For it to be incentive compatible for these contractors to supply correct e®ort, this reputation
must be su±ciently valuable { the wage paid must be su±ciently higher than their opportunity
cost. We denote this incentive compatible contractor's wage by wc(t); and recall that contractors
(like all agents in the model) live another period with probability ±. The contractor's incentive
compatibility condition simply requires that the contractor receive higher expected lifetime income
from contributing the correct e®ort to the ¯rm, than from shirking and working elsewhere.24 The
present discounted value of contributing the correct e®ort is the net present value of the income
22We keep discussion of the strategies which support this implicit contract informal in the text and provide a
more formal treatment of the equilibrium strategies in Appendix A. We could easily assume that the probability
that shirking is detected is less than one; however, this would not qualitatively a®ect the results. This type of
implicit contract corresponds to an e±ciency wage as denoted by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1982).
23Alternatively, w(t) could be the return to home production if the household labor allocation decision were
endogenously modeled, since equilibrium would ensure this return equals the market wage. A small re{speci¯cation
of the model would allow this interpretation, and once again, nothing important would change.
24Strictly, the IC constraint states that the contractor receive higher expected lifetime utility (not income) from
contributing correct e®ort than from shirking. These are equivalent here. The contractor has access to perfect
capital markets, at rate of interest r. Since he/she will always choose the optimal consumption path for a given
income stream, in order to work out which one of two action paths leads to higher utility we need only to compute
the net present value of the income stream.


















If a contractor produces the correct amount, he continues to receive the payment wc (¿)e a c h
period that he remains in the labor force. This is because, even if his current employer turns
over, his reputation as a reliable contractor in that industry persists so that new producers will
hire him as well. Note the important role of the public information assumption here; when a
¯rm turns over and a relationship ends, other agents know this was not a termination due to
m a l f e a s a n c eb yo n eo ft h ep a r t i e s .
If shirking in period t; the contractor receives the payment wc(t)a tt h es t a r to fp e r i o dt
but then contributes no e®ort to this ¯rm and instead obtains the market return for her e®ort
elsewhere, w(t): From then on, under all other agents' equilibrium strategies, she is never again
employed as a contractor, and thus receives the lower wage, w(¿)i ns u b s e q u e n tp e r i o d s . 25 That
































In a stationary steady state of an economy growing at rate g; condition (13) reduces con-






















where the in¯nite series converges since
±(1+g)
















25See Appendix A for the statement of the equilibrium strategies that clarify this sequence of payments. It is also
possible to construct equilibria in which individuals can, with some probability, again transition into employment
with a ¯rm as a contractor. This does not change the qualitative nature of the equilibrium but does raise the
equilibrium incentive compatible wage, since this lowers the punishment cost of dismissal.
26If one of these variables is growing at rate not equal to g; it either becomes arbitrarily small relative to y or
larger than y, but this then violates the stationarity of the model. To verify this, the value of wages in steady state
is computed after existence is established.
27To see that this condition does hold, recall the condition that is required to bound the consumer's problem (9).
Substituting into this condition using the consumer's Euler equation, (1 + r)=
(1+½)(1+g)1¡¾
± ,y i e l d s :
(1+g)
(1+r) < 1:
Recalling that ±<1; this necessarily implies that
±(1+g)
1+r < 1:
























The appendix formally states the strategies played by workers and ¯rms supporting this as
an equilibrium outcome, but we discuss them brie°y here. Incentive compatibility depends not
only on the ¯rm at which the worker currently works punishing shirking by not re-hiring, but also
other ¯rms doing so as well. However, it is assumed that third parties cannot observe the reason
for a termination between a worker and a ¯rm. Unless one of them \dies". If a relationship
ends between a contractor and a ¯rm due to a termination, it is impossible for third parties to
tell whether it was in fact due to shirking. Thus, agents' beliefs about the likely cause of the
termination (that is, beliefs o® the equilibrium path) play a critical role. In particular, in the
\contractor" type solution to the moral hazard problem, all other ¯rms believe that, when a
termination occurs, the worker involved will shirk if hired as a contractor in the future. These
o®{equilibrium path beliefs suggest to ¯rms that they should not hire such a worker in the future
and thus support the equilibrium by imposing large costs on shirkers. Moreover, given these
beliefs, as the appendix shows, it is optimal for workers who have experienced a termination in
the past to shirk in the future at wc (t); so that these beliefs are self-ful¯lling.
The incentive compatible wage from condition (17) can also be expressed in terms of the







In a faster growing economy, the wage premium required to ensure incentive compatibility is
lower since the future leads to relatively higher rewards.29 In contrast, in a slowdown, there is
an increase in the disparity between contractor wages and those of regular employees, a point to
w h i c hw er e t u r nl a t e r .
28Note that, in steady state, the contractor's payment will bind at this incentive compatible wage in industries
with worker moral hazard. For higher contractor wages, workers currently working at w(t) can credibly o®er their
services as a contractor for an amount greater than w(t); but below the wage of existing contractors, thus upsetting
the equilibrium. We return to this in section 3.2.
29Note that this condition seems to imply that the incentive compatible wage goes to zero as g !1 : However,
this is not possible since g is bounded by the need to have a well de¯ned consumer's problem. See also footnote 27.
132.4 Internal labor markets
Recall that intermediate production occurs in ¯rms owning the state of the art technology. Usu-
ally, these ¯rms do not have a signi¯cant role in this type of model, since their pro¯ts are
distributed to the dispersed shareholders of the economy, and it is assumed they simply hire
labor at the going wage, see Grossman and Helpman (1991). Here, however, we identify ¯rms
with their incumbency as owners of the state of the art technology. This has already been done
implicitly in calculating the discounted value of future ¯rm pro¯ts, Vj; which depends on the
¯rm's expected lifetime, 1
®Sj: Firms hold a patent ensuring them the exclusive right to produce
with the technology. The value of a patent is zero once the technology is no longer the state of
the art, and then the ¯rm disbands.30
If ¯rms can credibly commit to paying employees in the future for e®ort exerted today, there
exists another solution to the non-contractibility problem which we term an \internal labor mar-
ket'. The implicit contract between worker and ¯rm, in this case, speci¯es that the worker
contributes e®ort up front in promise of deferred payment. Later in the period, when the ¯rm
can infer the worker's contribution, the worker is paid. The worker undertakes to continue with
the ¯rm only if the ¯rm meets its promised payment. For this solution to work, it is necessary
that ¯rms who renege on promised payments are punished in their future dealings in the labor
market. Once again, punishments are the equilibrium actions of other players when observing ac-
tions that are not supposed to occur on the equilibrium path. These depend critically on agents'
beliefs in equilibrium, which are speci¯ed formally in Appendix A. Intuitively, punishment here
consists of future workers not believing that this ¯rm will meet their promised payments if the
¯rm has been involved in a termination in the past. Given these beliefs, future workers optimally
choose to reject o®ers of deferred payment in future, since they do not believe the ¯rm's promise
of rewards to follow. Given these beliefs, and that strategy of workers, the best response for
¯ r m sw h oh a v eb e e ni n v o l v e di nat e r m i n a t i o ni nt h ep a s ti st o ,i nf a c t ,c h e a ta n yw o r k e rw h o
does accept a job. Since their reputation has already been destroyed, they su®er no additional
reputational loss, and equilibrium strategies do not allow a ¯rm to re-establish their reputation.
This relational contract solves the moral hazard problem in production if ¯rms place enough
value on their reputations, which enable them to continue hiring workers through deferred pay-
ments. This valuation depends on their discount rate and their length of expected incumbency.
Since a ¯rm only lives pro¯tably until the next innovation arrives in its industry, it discounts
future pro¯ts by the probability of an innovation arriving, ®Sj; as well as the discount factor, r.
A critical di®erence between this solution to the moral hazard problem, and the previous
contractor solution, is that the ¯rm need only promise to pay workers the going wage, w(t):
There is no need for a wage premium since the moral hazard resides with the ¯rm. If the ¯rm
30Firms are indi®erent to remaining in existence if it is costless to do so; however, with even an arbitrarily small
cost of maintaining the ¯rm, shutting down and disbanding is strictly preferred.
14cheats and fails to pay a worker after e®ort is contributed, they obtain
y(t)
M today without cost in
the current period, since the optimal form of cheating will be to renege on all payments. The cost
of cheating is that they can only continue to produce in the future by contracting out production,
hence by paying wc (t); determined in equation (18). This is because no worker will believe that a
¯rm who cheated in the past will meet deferred payment obligations in the future. From equation
(6); the per period pro¯ts of an incumbent with its reputation in tact and who is able to pay the
going market wage, i.e., wj (t)=w(t); are given by

























In contrast, an incumbent who must resort to hiring contractors has to pay the higher wage,
wj (t)=wc (t): Thus, per period pro¯ts are:
¼c




















































j (t +2 )+::::: (21)
31Here, resorting to sub-optimal hiring behaviour cannot help ¯rms in satisfying their own incentive constraints.
Such behaviour was the solution to a similar commitment problem arising in Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994).
The logic of their solution works when ¯rms have a concave production function, and when cheating a worker
implies that only the relationship with the single worker is severred, not the whole workforce. In that situation, if
¯rms hire up to the optimal amount, that is where they are indi®erent between using the last unit or not, they have
strictly positive incentive to cheat the last unit, since they obtain the bene¯t of cheating, but only lose the service
of the last unit about whom they are indi®erent. To solve this problem, less labor than the pro¯t maximizing level
must be employed so that when the labor that is cheated is withdrawn, it imposes a positive cost on the ¯rm.
Here, however, as production is linear in L; ¯rms are not able to a®ect their own incentive compatibility conditions
by adjusting their labor hiring away from the optimal one that is implied by (20). Nor do they need to since,
when a ¯rm cheats one worker, and a separation occurs, in the internal labor market equilibrium, all other workers
rationally refuse to accept deferred payments from the ¯rm. So, the ¯rm is punished by being forced to pay a
wage premium to all future workers. This is also the reason why a ¯rm's best form of cheating involves violating
payment promises to all workers.
15If reneging on its commitment to meet promised payments (the RHS), the ¯rm will optimally
choose to pay all workers an amount 0; so that ¼j (t)=
y(t)
M ; for the period in which the ¯rm
































By once again imposing stationarity and using (17) to express wc(t); we can analyze the im-
plications of (22) in a stationary steady state. It reduces to a remarkably simple necessary and
su±cient condition:
Lemma 1 A necessary and su±cient condition for a ¯rm in industy j0s incentive compatibility
condition to hold is that their industry's per period probability of receiving a successful innovation,
®Sj satis¯es:
®Sj · 1 ¡ ±: (23)
Any industry with an innovation arrival probability greater than 1 ¡ ± cannot maintain an
internal labor market and must hire contract workers. The condition implies a dependence of
¯rms' incentive compatibility on workers' continuation probabilities. Rearranging the condition
as ± · 1 ¡ ®Sj; it says that the probability of a ¯rm staying in the relationship for one more
period (1¡®Sj) must exceed the probability of the worker doing so (±): If the worker has a higher
probability of continuing than the ¯rm, then the ¯rm will cheat.32 This is due to the fact that
the cost to the ¯rm of reneging on payments is relatively low since high ± implies a relatively low
contractor wage wc; and the bene¯t to the ¯rm of cheating is relatively high, since a low value of
(1 ¡ ®Sj) implies a relatively low probability of continuing for another period as incumbent and
3 Steady State Analysis
We now analyze the implied macroeconomic steady state ¯xing the contracting solution at the
microeconomic level within an industry. If an industry has a \contractor" solution, as analyzed
in section 2.3, then, for existence of a steady state with positive growth, necessarily, condition
(16) must hold. If an industry has an \internal labor market" solution as analyzed in section
2.4, then necessarily condition (22) must hold. We ¯rst proceed by calculating the steady state
when all sectors have an \internal labor market" solution. We then show that when technological
32Note that if (23) fails there is no possibility of satisfying incentive compatibility for the ¯rm by resorting to
some other division of the surplus. To see why, note that, since the worker only receives w(t); the ¯rm is already
receiving the full amount of the rent from the relationship and this is not high enough given their low valuation
of the future. Lowering this further by giving some of the surplus to the worker, i.e. by raising w only makes the
¯rm's incentive compatibility condition worse. However, there is still the possibility of the relationship changing
to a \contractor" solution and the worker's incentive compatibility condition holding, as in Section (2:3):
16possibilities increase (® rises) the economy's growth rate monotonically rises provided that all
industries continue with an internal labor market structure. This is standard in Schumpeterian
growth models, since an increase in ® raises expected returns to research, and thus induces
greater research e®ort, higher innovation rates, and consequently, higher growth. However, for
high enough ®; we show that the \internal labor market" contracting structure is not sustainable
(in particular, condition (23) is violated).
3.1 Stationary Steady State with Internal labor Markets
We ¯rst solve for a steady state in which all hiring is done through internal labor markets. All
steady states that we analyze will involve each sector undertaking positive research, and thus
contributing to growth, in equilibrium.33 Since industries are heterogeneous, they vary in °j; a
su±cient condition for existence will be necessary to ensure that there is enough incentive for
research in equilibrium. That is, incentives for research, which depend upon ° and ®; need to be
high enough to ensure that positive research is undertaken in each sector. We derive a su±cient
condition for existence here. Recall again that in such a stationary steady state g must also be
t h er a t eo fg r o w t hi nw a g e sw,p r o ¯ t s¼ and consumption c; which we shall verify:
Formally, a stationary steady state, is an allocation of research workers, Sj; and a correspond-
ing labor allocation to production, Lj for each industry, j; such that:
(I) All labor is employed: equation (2) holds with equality.
(II) Monopolists demand labor according to (7).
(III) The equilibrium growth rate is given by (12).
(IV) Consumers are optimizing: r is determined by (8):
(V) The labor market clears: Sj solves (11).
(VI) Employment contracts are incentive compatible: condition (22) holds,
In addition to these conditions, ¯rms' and employees' strategies must support honest ful¯llment
of implicit contracts, that is, the equilibrium strategies support condition (22); as elaborated in
Appendix A.
Since monopolists in all sectors compete for homogeneous labor; and since we consider a
steady state in which all industries hire through an internal labor market, wj (t)=w(t) for all j:
33This is without loss of generality. With lower productivity of research, steady states with growth coming from
research in only the high ° sectors will exist. In such steady states, the low ° sectors play no real role other than
to constantly absorb a fraction of the labour force. This can be easily allowed for here but is not of extra interest.
As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), there also exists another equilibrium in which the economy cycles between high
and low growth, driven by expectations, we focus solely on the stationary steady state. In addition, our framework
always also admits equilibria in which research and production shuts down in all sectors. This is possible here
because of the contracting incompleteness in production which always admit the possibility of a bad equilibrium in
which no agent trusts others to ful¯ll their side of delayed commitment. This corresponds to agents simply playing
the Nash equilibrium of the single shot game, which is always an equilibrium of the repeated game. In that case
both output and growth are zero in steady state. These are also equilibria which we do not consider here since
they seem of limited applicability.






M for each sector
















In stationary steady state,
y(t)
w(t) is necessarily a constant, which we can solve for using the mar-
ket clearing condition in intermediate production. For each intermediate industry j; the Cobb-










: On the supply side, xs
j (t)=Lj (t)°nj(t): Thus, xs
j (t)=xd




due to Lj (t)=Lj in stationary steady state. The equation also implies that the term Lj°j must
also be the same for all industries j: Therefore, without loss of generality, we use L1° where L1
denotes the allocation of production labor to industries with lowest step size, i.e. sector 1 with













This equation computes the allocation of labor in research that is consistent with labor market






the amount of labor allocated to production, L1.












¾ = Sm (t) 8j 2 m; (27)
where Sm(t) denotes the allocation of labor to research in a single industry of sector m: Note
that this is increasing in °m so that Sm(t)i sh i g h e rf o rh i g h e rm: Since, in steady state, Sm(t)
is time invariant, we drop the t notation.
From (12) ; the innovation technology also yields an expression for g a saf u n c t i o no fs e c t o r a l















34Recall that sectors m>1 all have step size A
m¡1°: In computing the steady state, we work with L1 but we


















Sm ((lnA)m ¡ lnA +l n°) (28)

















((lnA)m ¡ lnA +ln°): (29)
We can solve for L1 using the economy's resource constraint, equation (2); which holds with
equality in steady state:














































































® ´ ­; so that L1 = N¡­M
°M : Substituting (30) into (29) yields
an expression in one unknown, g; that is, the economy's growth rate in a steady state where all













((lnA)(m ¡ 1) + ln°)
¸
(31)
























A1¡M (M (A ¡ 1) + 1) ¡ A
¢¤
(32)
where g enters the RHS of this expression through ­ only. Provided incentives for research are
high enough and ¯rms live long enough to support incentive compatibility of contracts, a positive












there exists a unique steady state satisfying conditions (I) to (VI) with corresponding growth rate
g¤; and sectoral allocation of research, fS¤
mg; provided that the necessary condition for suporting
internal labour markets ®S¤
M · 1 ¡ ± holds.
The existence condition is intuitive. It simply states that the returns from research, °; and the
likelihood of research success ® have to be high enough relative to the discount rate
1+½
± (which
is the opportunity cost of research since research costs labor e®ort today and produces returns
only in the future). Moreover the economy's stock of human capital relative to the number of
sectors undertaking research, N
M must be high enough for there to exist incentives for research in
even the least productive sector.
In this steady state, each sector experiences ongoing research but at di®ering levels of intensity,
®Sj; re°ecting the di®ering pro¯t opportunities available. Firms have su±ciently long expected
lives to be able to o®er a credible commitment of deferred payments to their workers, so hiring
o c c u r st h r o u g ha ni n t e r n a ll a b o rm a r k e tw i t hm o r a lh a z a r do nt h e¯ r m ' ss i d e .W o r k e r st h e r e f o r e
contribute e®ort to production in advance of payment, and ¯rms reward e®ort once it has been
inferred. Since there is no moral hazard on the worker's side, there is no need for a wage premium
and workers are simply paid the market clearing wage in all sectors, w(t): The sectoral allocations
to production and research are pinned down once g is determined from (32): That is, given g;
L1 is obtained from (30);L 1 then pins down the value of Lj in all other sectors j,s i n c eLj°j is
20a constant. Given L1 and g; research in each sector, Sj is given by (27): Prices within a period
are completely pinned down by the technology, the evolution of which is determined by Sj: The
market clearing wage, w(t) is computed from the production function and determined by the
technology so that this grows proportionately with y and ¼.35
We now consider the e®ect of an increase in the productivity of research on the economy's
growth in steady state.
3.2 Information Technology
There are many e®ects that the introduction of computers and the general revolution in infor-
mation can have on production: it can increase the need for training, lead to a substitution of
capital for labor, improve distribution, directly change production e±ciency, etc. We wish to
abstract from all of these and focus purely upon the increase in the availability of information
and therefore in the speed of dissemination of new ideas. In this way, we focus purely on the e®ect
of the information technology revolution in speeding up the arrival of new ideas (or equivalently,
in reducing the cost of research). We posit that this is a truly general purpose technology that
improves the research productivity of all sectors, though qualitatively similar results will obtain
if only some sectors are a®ected, or if sectors are a®ected to di®ering degrees.
To consider the consequences of such a change, we consider the e®ect of increasing the tech-
nological parameter, ®; capturing the marginal e®ect of research on the innovation arrival proba-
bility. If the contracting structure within industries remains unchanged, we have the same steady
state as in Proposition 1, and the rate of growth simply increases with the increased research
e®ectiveness.
Corollary 1 With a ¯xed structure of contracts in the economy, increasing ® increases the econ-
omy's growth rate.
As usually occurs in a Schumpeterian growth model with increasing productivity of research,
greater returns to research imply more research and higher growth. However, it is not always
possible for the contracting structure to remain unchanged. Starting in a situation in which all
sectors have internal labor markets (that is, there is no contract work), increasing ® eventually
makes hiring contractors the only solution to the moral hazard problem:
Proposition 2 For the highest sector, M; there exists a unique value of ®; denoted ®0
M such
that for ®>® 0
M; sector M cannot hire workers in an internal labour market. Consequently, for
®>® 0
M; the steady state de¯ned by conditions (I) to (VI) no longer exists.
















M : Since this depends only on nj; it grows proportionately with both y and
¼ in steady state.
21The contracting structure is not impervious to changes in ® because the increase in arrival
rates, ®Sj; eventually renders ¯rms' expectations of the length of a productive relationship with
their employees short. If short enough (leading to a violation of condition (23)), ¯rms cannot
credibly commit to providing deferred bene¯ts to their employees. This problem arises earlier
(i.e. for lower values of ®) for industries with higher °; since these are the industries that attract
proportionately more research, and hence have higher arrival rates, holding all else equal.
As ® increases, and a sector becomes unable to hire employees in the internal labor market,
a possible solution is for it to hire contractors. If this is possible, then not only does this sector
change the structure of its hiring, but also the economy's steady state changes. Formally, if
condition (VI) cannot hold since (22) is violated, the existence of a steady state in which all
sectors grow depends on the existence of a \contractor" solution to the moral hazard problem
in these high ° sectors. Let m0 denote the lowest sector for which internal labor markets cannot
operate; that is, the lowest value of m such that ®
0
m <® :We now look for a steady state in which
the sectors that are unable to hire with internal labor markets, instead solve the moral hazard
problem through incentive compatible \contractor" solutions. Therefore, we replace condition
(VI) in our steady state conditions with:
(VI0): Employment contracts are incentive compatible: therefore, for sectors m<m 0 condi-
tion (22) holds, and for sectors m ¸ m0 condition (16) holds.
The other conditions describing a steady state are unaltered since, even though they are
a®ected by employment contracts, they must still hold as stated.36
The following proposition establishes the existence of a unique steady state satisfying condi-




















there exists a unique steady state satisfying conditions (I) to (VI0) with corresponding growth
rate g¤ and sectoral allocation of research, S¤
m, provided that for m<m 0; internal labor markets
can be supported: ®S¤
m · 1 ¡ ± holds:
This existence condition is of the same structure as the previous one for the steady state with







implies that the step size in the smallest industry ° now has to exceed
1+½
±2 > 1 instead of 1
as before. This is required since it is more di±cult to guarantee that it is possible to operate
pro¯tably when wage costs are higher. As before, the condition is more likely to hold the higher are
®; N and °;and the smaller is
1+½
± and M:Note also that, when m0 = M+1; that is, all sectors can
36The other conditions are market clearing and optimization conditions for consumers and ¯rms, so though the
details of these are a®ected, the conditions as stated in (I) to (V), that is conditions (2); (7); (12); (8); and (11)
do not change.
















In that case, we have the same existence condition as in proposition (1) since
1+½
±2 is replaced by
1 since all employers can pay w.
This steady state features sectors m ¸ m0 hiring contractors, and sectors m<m 0 hiring
t h r o u g ha ni n t e r n a ll a b o rm a r k e t . 37 Notice that the necessity part only depends on the incentive
compatibility conditions in sectors m<m 0: For ® high enough, it is impossible to satisfy these
conditions in any sectors. In that case, m0 = 1 and all sectors hire with contractors. Existence
of the contractor solution is, of course, not adversely a®ected by increasing ® as can be seen
immediately from condition (33): The upshot is that as ® increases, the cut-o® sector m0 is
decreasing. In other words, the number of sectors able to sustain internal labor markets is falling.
However, the capacity to solve the moral hazard problem with a contractor solution is una®ected
by increasing ®:
3.3 The slowdown
We now demonstrate that the economy must experience a slowdown as ® increases beyond certain
critical values. Beyond these critical ® values, m0 falls and fewer sectors can sustain internal labor
markets. The e®ect of a fall in m0 on the growth rates is shown in the next proposition:
Proposition 4 Consider an economy in steady state as described by conditions (I) to (VI0),w i t h
a contracting structure such that m0 ¸ 2. If a small increase in the productivity of research, ®,
implies that a sector is now unable to hire in an internal labour market and must switch to the
use of contractors. That is,
®S¤
m0 · 1 ¡ ± (34)
no longer holds, then m0 falls, and the economy's growth rate falls.
When a sector loses the ability to hire workers in an internal labor market, its production
costs rise thus lowering the pro¯tability of research. This de¯nitely lowers research in that sector;
but by releasing labor, it raises research e®orts in the rest of the economy. This reallocation of
researchers is generally from the switching sectors with high returns in research toward stable
sectors with lower returns, since the higher ones are less able to support internal labor markets.
This lowers the economy's growth rate, which, in turn, further lowers incentives for research. The
37Note that the existence condition ensures that workers live long enough for it to be possible to satisfy the
worker's incentive compatibility condition in steady state. If this were not the case then, when ¯rms' incentive
compatibility conditions did not hold, i.e for m>m
0; there would no longer be any possibility of either production,
or research in those sectors, since neither worker's nor ¯rm's incentive compatibility conditions would hold. This
would imply that the slowdown result, which we establish in the next section, would be even more pronounced,
since instead of a reduction in growth in some sectors we obtain a complete cessation of growth. Though the
qualitative behaviour of the model is una®ected, we do not analyze this case since a complete halt of production
in some sectors seems somewhat less realistic.
23proposition shows that when a sector changes in this way, growth always falls provided m0 ¸ 2;
that is, provided the sector changing is not the last one.
Thus, in addition to the well known positive e®ect of an increase in ® on the economy's growth
rate, the induced change in contracting at the micro level exerts a negative e®ect. Which e®ect
dominates depends on the magnitude of the change in ®. The positive e®ect works continuously
to increase growth; but for continual increase in ®; it is punctuated by discrete downward jumps
in growth as sectors' contracting structures endogenously change. Can such downward jumps
actually lead to an overall growth slowdown? To obtain an idea of the likely magnitude of the
relative e®ects, we simulate the model.
3.4 Simulation of the model
Since we have already analytically established that growth falls when a sector is no longer able to
sustain an internal labor market, for small increases in ®, the simulations allow us to investigate
whether such falls are simply downward perturbations that are swamped by the positive e®ects
of increasing ® over longer ranges, or whether these falls are signi¯cant relative to the increases.
We normalize the economy's endowment of human capital to 1 and start with the number of
sectors equal to 5 for baseline simulations: Parameter values must satisfy the existence conditions,
ensuring that there is su±cient incentive for positive research in each sector (this will be true
as long as it holds in the lowest ° sector) and must also ensure that the arrival probability of
innovations is well de¯ned, ®Sj < 1: The parameter values are chosen relative to our de¯nition
of a period. In the model, a period is the time elapsed between a worker's poor performance
and the ¯rm's capacity to infer that ex post. Thus, a day seems too short, for then the cost
of shirking would be small, but alternatively a year is probably too long, ¯rms should generally
be able to infer unreliability more quickly than that. So, we choose a baseline of 6 months,
implying that the approximate 15 year average survival probability within an occupation requires
a ± value of 0:97. Similarly a 2% discount, or ½ = :02 is suitable as a baseline case for a 6 month
period. We set ¾ = :25; so that the consumer's intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals
1.33.38 There is a degree of freedom in our choice of the parameters ° and ®: Recall that ° is the
smallest productivity increment for innovations arriving in the economy (that is in sector 1); and ®
re°ects the marginal productivity of e®ort targetted at innovations (i.e. the likelihood of research
e®ort yielding success). Any given level of target growth rate in the model can be generated by
inversely varying ° and ®: Relatively high ° and low ® implies low chances of large productivity
enhancements with research, whereas, low ° and high ® implies higher likelihood of success which
is of less impact. The variable ®, which is a parameter of the research production function,
38Our choice of utility function does not allow examining of cases where this elasticity is less than one. Beaudry
and van Wincoop (1996) argue, using disaggregated data, for elasticities exceeding one, although more macro based
estimates reject such high values. The principal e®ect of lowering ¾ is that starting growth rates fall, but this does
not greatly a®ect the simulated slowdown results we report below.
24does not have directly observable correlates and must be varied with our choice of normalization
for labor market size so it is not useful to calibrate from. In contrast, °; which measures the
productivity advantage of new innovations over incumbents, is re°ected in markups about which
there is considerable evidence. We take as a reasonable benchmark a starting value of ° =1 :2:
a n dt h e nc h o o s e® to yield reasonable growth rates. This is a sensible productivity increment
in the least productive sectors as it implies that innovations in the lowest sector are 20% more







= ° =1 :2; which is about the middle of the range estimated by Norrbin (1993) and
Basu (1996).
Finally, we need to specify the productivity increment di®erences across sectors. We take a low
value for the di®erences across sectors, A =1 :01. Increasing A and M implies larger di®erences
between returns to research in the high and low ° sectors since the productivity increment of an
innovation in the highest research sector is AM¡1 times greater than that in the lowest.39 Given
these values, since we wish to generate a reasonable growth rate, we solve out a starting value
for ® =1 :5; to generate growth of about 1.7% per period. This is quite high for 6 month periods,
but recall that we have an economy where all sectors are contributing to growth, so appended to
an economy with some non-growing sectors this is not unreasonable.
Figure 3 depicts the corresponding steady state growth rates, for increasing values of ®; in
this baseline case of the model. The discrete downward jumps in the ¯gure occur due to the
falls in m0; as sectors shift from internal labor market to contractor solutions, as expected from
Proposition 4. The last downward jump occurs at around ® =2 ; when the lowest sector is then
unable to hire on an internal labor market. From then on, increases in ® monotonically increase
the economy's growth rate. Overall, the falls in growth accompanying contractual changes are
large in comparison with the standard positive e®ects of increased ®: Taking ® =1 :5 as our initial
starting point, the ¯gure shows that growth does not reach its pre-slowdown levels again until ®
is at least 2.3. That is, an increase in ®; and hence research productivity of 0:8
1:5 =5 3 % ; is required
before growth rates eventually reach the starting level of 1.7%. Note that without the change in
c o n t r a c t i n gs u c ha ni n c r e a s ei n® of 53% would have lead to a growth rate of 5.44%, i.e. over a
300% increase in the growth rate.40 This baseline case thus suggests a possible explanation of
the slowdown. If the IT revolution is interpreted as a GPT that increases ® at the economy wide
level, the corresponding contractual changes induced at the micro level require a massive increase
in research productivity (around 50%) for the economy to sustain growth rates of the same level.
The result in this baseline case persists for variations in parameters provided the value of °
39As will be seen, a consequence of large di®erences is that in order to obtain existence of steady states in which
even the lowest ° sector undertakes research requires a relatively severe restriction on the values of °: Ap o i n t
which we discuss subsequently.
40The reason for the more than proportional e®ect of the increases in research productivity is the large induced





















edoes not reach implausibly high levels. Varying the consumer's parameters (¾, ½ and ±)d o e sn o t
change the qualitative result of large downward e®ects of contracting structure changes relative
to the productivity enhancements. Lowering the value of ° towards the bottom of the range,
° =1 :05; increases the slowdown range, however the e®ect becomes weaker as the value of °
is higher. For instance comparing with the benchmark case of ° =1 :2 and its 53% increase in
® required for the economy to be back at the starting growth rate, when ° =1 :3t h e no n l ya
33% increase in ® is required for the economy's growth rate to be the same when all sectors
are unable to hire on an internal labor market. This value of ° is still within the range of
markups estimated by Norrbin (1993) and Basu (1996) who ¯nd a range of ° =1 :05 to 1:4:
However, even for implausibly high values of °; for instance ° =1 :5; the range is signi¯cant,
though lower still, approximately 15%. The reason for the size of the range falling with the
value of ° is that the direct positive e®ect of an increase in ® is greater for higher °,w h e r e a s
the decline in growth due to the negative e®ect is relatively unchanged. For very high values
of °, even small changes in ® h a v el a r g ep o s i t i v ee ® e c t so nt h eg r o w t hr a t es i n c ea n yi n d u c e d
increases in research, and increases in the probability of success, serve to raise the chance of a very
large increment to productivity, and thus increase the economy's rate of growth. For example, a
slowdown will not occur in this baseline case when values of ° exceed 1.6. Growth rates still fall
when a sector changes contracting structure, but these declines are only downward spikes which
are quickly outweighed by even small further increases in ®: Encouragingly, only such implausibly
high values of ° eliminate the slowdown range altogether.41
In the simulation, each increase in ® is solved for as a new steady state. The actual ® incre-
ments accompanying the introduction of a GPT like the IT revolution are probably not smoothly
occurring as in the ¯gures of the simulation, but rather discrete jumps along the horizontal axis.
Therefore, the range of ® values for which the slowdown occur are best understood as an indica-
tion of how likely such positive increments to research productivity are to generate an explanation
for the slowdown. A small range suggests this is very unlikely, but the large range shown in the
baseline case, which persists for reasonable values of the mark-up, is supportive of the slowdown
possibility.
The next corollary lists the qualitative nature of any changes that accompany a slowdown in
41T h em o d e lc a nb es o l v e df o rM and A that are large but it implies implausibly high values of °: This is because
the perfect inter-sectoral substitutability of research e®ort implies that to start in a steady state where the highest
sector is able to maintain an internal labour market it is necessary for ® to be relatively small, otherwise ®SM will
be too large. But then a relatively high value of ° is required to maintain su±cient incentives for positive research
in the lowest sector. For instance with A =1 :04, M =10 and ® =0 :6; it is necessary that °>1:58 in order to
ensure that S1 > 0: This requires for the highest sector a productivity increment of °M =( 1 :58)(1:04)
9 =2 :248;
or a markup exceeding 100% of costs. Even in the lowest sector, the markup of 1.58 greatly exceeds the upper
bound for average gross markups in Norrbin (1993) and Basu (1996). But it is not possible to lower the value of °
to more reasonable levels by increasing ® since then the internal labour market constraint in the high ° sectors is
violated. To see this note that, for these parameters, the di®erence 1 ¡ ± ¡ ®SM =9 :14 £ 10
¡3; so that any small
increase in ® will make this fail:
26this model.
Corollary 2 If an increase in ® causes a slowdown, then: (i) the proportion of the labor force
without guarantee of ongoing employment increases, (ii) relative returns of workers in high °
sectors rise, (iii) income inequality rises and (iv) sectors with the largest declines in productivity
growth will be the ones that initially had the highest rates of growth.
There can be no slowdown without a restructuring of labor contracts in some sectors. Without
such a change, the arrival of innovations simply increases with a rise in ®; a n dg r o w t hr i s e s .
A lower growth rate lowers individuals' valuations of the future; and therefore, as can be
seen from equation (18), contractors must be compensated more immediately to maintain incen-
tives. Since contractors start at higher wages than employees, further changes in the contracting
structure along the slowdown worsen inequality in the earnings distribution by lowering returns
to workers while simultaneously increasing the premium to contractors. Since the increase here
would not be attributable to observable worker characteristics (for example, education and train-
ing levels), unless earnings equations were estimated with information about contract structure,
i tw o u l db ep i c k e du pi nt h er e s i d u a lo fa ne a r n i n g se q u a t i o n . 42 This corresponds well to the
¯ndings of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) where such earnings equations (which are estimated
without information about the form of employment contracts) attributed much of the growth in
inequality to unmeasured components.
Furthermore, the increases in inequality that occur happen in the high ° sectors. That is,
these will tend to occur in industries where, for given contracting structure, there are higher
growth rates. A positive correlation between industry wages and technological change has been
observed in many studies, Hodson and England (1986), Dickens and Katz (1987) and Loh (1992).
Though, it should be noted that Bartel and Sicherman (1999), by controlling for individual ¯xed
e®ects, argue that most of this is due to sorting of high \ability" individuals into sectors with
higher rates of technological change.
The model's implications for turnover are similar to a standard growth model, with industries'
growth rates positively correlated with turnover. An interesting implication, however, is the
model's results regarding workers' perceptions of job security. During the slowdown, the change
in labor markets from internal labor market hiring, with promises of ongoing employment, to
contractor situations, where there is no such commitment by the employer, imply less job security
for employees.43 This is consistent with perceptions of greater job insecurity over the period. As
presented in Aaronson and Sullivan (1998), surveys of worker perceptions of job security in the
General Social Survey, spanning 1977-1996, show that white collar and college educated workers
42This serves to make this model testably di®erent than Galor and Moav's (1999) model with technological
change which is ability biased, where ability is unobservable.
43Though not necessarily employment or income security, since these depend on re-employment possibilities.
27experienced substantial increases in job insecurity in the 1990s. The period also corresponded
with a \sea-change" in the norms and expectations of professional careers, caused by the erosion
of internal labor markets, see Smith (1997) and D. Gordon (1996). This downward trend in job
security is also reported for the same period by Schmidt (1999).
An implication of the slowdown generated by an increasing ® is that it is of ¯nite duration.
In this framework, productivity can only fall with ® increasing if contracts change. In particular,
when labor hiring practices in all sectors have changed towards contracts, there will no longer
be the possibility of a slowdown precipitated by further increases in ®; although, for ® ¯xed,
productivity growth rates will remain at lower levels.
In this model, we have assumed that the population is ¯xed. However if instead of increasing
the technological parameter we increased the population, we could generate similar results. Fix-
ing the contracting structure, a population increase will increase the amount of research being
undertaken and therefore the arrival rates of new innovations through a standard scale e®ect.
This interacts with the contracting structure in approximately the same manner as described
above. And so, in this model, we can generate a short-term negative relationship between pop-
ulation growth and the growth rate. A series of newer versions of technology-based endogenous
growth already allow for the possibility of a negative relationship between population growth and
productivity growth. However, these models (Young 1998, Howitt 1999, and Segerstrom 1999)
do not suggest why the slowdown should have occurred when it did. In contrast, our model
even when change is motivated by population growth (not technology) relates the macro changes
to observed contemporaneous changes in the labor market, and thus, links the timing of the
slowdown to the period of those changes.44
A ¯nal point to note is that a ¯rm's productive life is assumed to end when a new innovation
arrives. However, in reality, many ¯rms produce more than one type of good. These ¯rms may
still be able to provide a form of commitment to employees by shifting them from newly redundant
processes to other productive roles. In fact, within any one ¯rm, there will be employees with
di®ering levels of job security, depending on how wedded their employment is to the technology
they are using in production. However, it will still be the case that the ¯rm's commitment to
any particular employee will vary with that employee's expected productive life with the ¯rm. A
¯rm's capacity to commit to lengthy employment will not necessarily end with the arrival of faster
innovations at the industry level, but should still be negatively a®ected by them. A similar °avor
of e®ect has been explored by Bertrand (1999). She examines whether employment relationships
adjust under increased product market competition and found that increased ¯nancial pressure
(proxied through increased import competition) transformed the employment relationship from
44Note that the insights we obtain from the current model translate fully into the framework of this newer
generation of Schumpeterian growth models. The steady state with contracting incompleteness will persist in those
frameworks and will similarly lead to an increase in the proportion of sectors that are unable to sustain internal
labour markets as the productivity of research rises.
28one governed by implicit agreements to one governed by the market. An interpretation she
forwards, which is consistent with our hypothesis, is that increased competition weakens the
enforceability of implicit wage agreements, so that the spot market governs the relationship.
4 Conclusion
The paper has developed a framework that explores a somewhat subtle two way interaction
between contracting at the micro level and the growth of the macroeconomy. An implication
of this interaction is that an increase in the productivity of research can actually lower the
economy's growth rate, in contrast to all previous Schumpeterian growth models. We have argued
that the slowdown generated here by an increase in productivity of research, can provide some
insight into the actual slowdown that hit the US economy from the early 1970's, corresponding
to the IT revolution. Other explanations of the slowdown, such as Helpman and Trajtenberg's
(1996) explanation based on the costs associated with dissemination of such a General Purpose
Technology, or Lloyd-Ellis's (1999) explanation, arising from a fall in supply of quali¯ed workers
and hence a reduction in absorptive capacity, are not mutually exclusive. Certainly such supply
side e®ects would similarly slow down growth in our model.
A promising feature of our approach is that it suggests a set of contemporaneous changes which
seemed to occur with the slowdown: for example; that the source of increased earnings dispersion
is in the residual of earnings regressions; that relatively large increases in earnings should occur in
the sectors with most innovativeness; and that along the slowdown workers should have increased
perceptions of job insecurity. However, we recognize that the extreme parsimony of the model
precludes a more careful analysis of the detailed inter-sectoral changes that actually did occur.
In our opinion a model which could be seriously taken to the data would at least also require
solutions to be provided for corner cases, where innovation possibilities stop in some sectors
altogether, and the introduction of a meaningful role for capital. We leave the building of such
an extension to future work.
5A p p e n d i x A :
5.0.1 Strategies supporting the incentive compatible incomplete contracts
Information sets:
A strategy maps from each player's information set to the set of actions.
Consistent with the information assumptions, at any time t; all workers and ¯rms know
the past history of all ¯rm/worker employment pairs, referred to as their public information.
Importantly, public information sets do not include the reason for a worker/¯rm relationship
to terminate, except if a worker died or a ¯rm ended production. A \termination" refers to
29the ending of a relationship for reasons other than death or closing down. The agents involved
themselves know the reason for a termination, other agents do not know whether it was due to
¯rm, worker, or both parties not ful¯lling promised obligations. A worker, i0s, public history at
time t is denoted hi (t); with hi (t) = 1 if the worker has not been involved in a termination for
any ¿ · t,a n dhi (t)=0 ; otherwise. Similarly, a ¯rm, j's, public history at time t is denoted
hj (t); with hj (t)=1i ft h e¯ r mh a sn o tb e e ni n v o l v e di nat e r m i n a t i o nf o ra n y¿ · t,a n d
hj (t)=0 ; otherwise. In addition, both workers and ¯rms have some private information. A
worker knows her own e®ort contribution upto time t.F o rw o r k e ri; this is denoted ei (t); with
ei (t) = 1 if the worker has contributed promised e®ort for all ¿ · t; and ei (t)=0 ; otherwise.
As well, the worker knows the payment history of any ¯rm with which it has been involved.
Thus, for ¯rm j the worker i knows whether j has paid the promised amounts to i in all previous
interactions between i and j,d e n o t e dp
j
i (t): If the ¯rm has paid all amounts that were promised
then p
j
i (t)=1 ; otherwise, p
j
i (t)=0 : In the case of no previous interactions, p
j
i (t)=1 : Firms
know their own private histories and the histories of the workers in their interactions with them.
Thus, ¯rm j knows whether it has paid promised amounts to all its workers, if it has then
pj (t)=1 ; otherwise pj (t)=0 : If a ¯rm has never before promised payments, then pj (t)=1 :
Similarly, if a ¯rm has employed an employee i, it knows whether the employee has contributed
the promised amounts of e®ort when working for j, if it has, for all ¿ · t then e
j
i (t)=1 ; otherwise
e
j
i (t)=0 : If they have never before interacted, e
j
i (t)=1 :
A worker's information set in period t comprises the public histories of all ¯rms and workers
upto and including period t ¡ 1;h W (t ¡ 1) [ hF (t ¡ 1); where W is the set of all workers and
F the set of all ¯rms, as well as the private information they have from their own employment





i (t ¡ 1)
o
for all j 2 Fi: A ¯rm's information set comprises the public histories
of all ¯rms and workers up to and including period t ¡ 1;h W (t ¡ 1) [ hF (t ¡ 1) as well as the
private information they have from their own history as an employer. In particular, they know
pj (t ¡ 1) and the information they have on the set of workers who have worked for them in the








Denote a worker's strategy by ¾w (t). It has two parts: ¯rstly, it speci¯es a decision of whether
to accept or reject every level of wage o®er from every ¯rm, these wage o®ers can be either up
front o®ers, or o®ers that a ¯rm promises to pay at the end of the period. Secondly, where up
front wage o®ers have been accepted from a given ¯rm, it speci¯es a decision of whether to work
(ei =1 )o rs h i r k( ei = 0) for a given ¯rm and whether to continue in the relationship or terminate
it.
Denote a ¯rm's strategy by ¾f (t): It has two parts: ¯rstly, whether to o®er up front payments
to workers or to o®er payments at the end of the period, and the amounts to o®er. Then, for end
30of period payments o®ered to a particular worker, it speci¯es whether to honor those payments,
(pj =1 )o rn o t( pj = 0) and whether to continue in the relationship or terminate it.
5.0.2 Equilibrium strategies for a `contractor' outcome:
Denote these strategies by e ¾f (t)a n de ¾w (t):
e ¾
f
j (t) for ¯rm j - For any worker i with hi (t ¡ 1) = 1 and pj (t ¡ 1):e
j
i (t ¡ 1) = 1; o®er wc
from equation (18) upfront, for all other workers make no o®er.
If e
j
i (t)=0 ; i.e., the worker shirks, terminate the relationship. If not, continue with the relation-
ship.
If starting production, ¯rst make o®ers to the workers who worked for the previous incumbent,
provided they satisfy hi (t ¡ 1) = 1.
Do not honor commitments to make deferred payments.
e ¾w
i (t) for individual i - accept any non-negative wage o®er made up front, do not accept o®ers
of deferred wage payments.
If the up front wage w is such that w ¸ wc and hi (t ¡ 1) = 1 and p
j
i (t ¡ 1):ei (t ¡ 1) = 1; then
set ei =1 ; otherwise set ei =0 :
These strategies induce, as an equilibrium wage in that sector, the wage wc with no workers
shirking and all ¯rms rehiring the same employees if and only if they do not shirk and they remain
in the labor market. If a worker dies, ¯rms then choose randomly from the pool of applicants (some
of whom are new workers, but this is irrelevant since they all have hw (t ¡ 1) = 1); and if a ¯rm
turns over new ¯rms hire their employees (since their reputations are in tact, i.e. hw (t ¡ 1) = 1.
To see that this is an equilibrium consider the returns to agents choosing actions deviating
from the equilibrium strategies. Consider ¯rst the incentives of a worker to deviate from e ¾w
i (t).
If the worker shirks under a w ¸ wc; and works elsewhere for the alternative wage of w(t)s h e
cannot be made better o®, since under e ¾
f
j (t) she will never again be hired as a contractor so that
incentive compatible wages are given by equation (18); which de¯nes wc. Consider the optimality
of the strategies for paths that are o® the equilibrium play. For instance, suppose that a worker
shirks in period t; and thus, according to e ¾
f
j (t) is dismissed by the ¯rm. The worker's strategy
e ¾w
i (t)s t a t e st h a tt h ew o r k e rw i l ls h i r ka g a i na twc (t): This is optimal for the worker. To see
this, note that for all future ¿>t , public information over the worker will now be hi (¿)=0 :
Thus, under e ¾
f
j (t); even if the worker is currently working, she anticipates never again being
hired at wage wc in future, that is, her employment will be terminated at the end of the period.
Thus her optimal action is to shirk. Suppose alternatively that the ¯rm o®ers the worker a wage
w<w c; the worker's strategy says the worker should accept the wage and shirk. This is clearly
optimal since w<w c is not incentive compatible. Consider a ¯rm's incentive to deviate from
e ¾
f
j (t): Suppose, for instance, that in period t + 1 the ¯rm decides not to dismiss a worker that
shirked in period t.S i n c et h ew o r k e rs h i r k e di np e r i o dt then ei (t)=0 : Thus under the worker's
31strategy, e ¾w
i (t); the worker will shirk again, and the ¯rm will su®er a loss. So non-employment of
a shirker is optimal. Suppose that the ¯rm decides to terminate the employment of a worker that
has not shirked. This does not increase the ¯rm's pro¯ts, thus retaining a non-shirker is a weak
best response. It is also a weak best response for new ¯rms to hire workers who did not shirk for
the previous incumbent. Suppose that a ¯rm tried to deviate to a hiring type equilibrium. That
is, it o®ered workers no payments up front, but promised to pay them after work is completed.
Under e ¾w
i (t) no worker would accept the o®er. Clearly for the ¯rm to deviate to any w<w c is
also not optimal, since e ¾w
i (t) speci¯es workers will take the wage and shirk.
Note the form of beliefs induced by these strategies. Though workers and ¯rms do not know
the precise reason for a termination in this equilibrium they believe that, once one has occured,
the worker will shirk again at wc: Moreover, these beliefs will be true, the worker will ¯nd it
optimal to shirk from then on, so the beliefs are consistent. Of course, along the equilibrium play,
shirking paths are not realized.
5.0.3 Equilibrium strategies for an `internal labor markets' outcome:
Denote these strategies by b ¾f (t)a n db ¾w (t):
b ¾
f
j (t) for ¯rm j -I f®S¤
j · 1 ¡ ± as de¯ned in (23); then, provided hj (t ¡ 1) = 1; and,
for worker i; hi (t ¡ 1) = 1; and pj (t ¡ 1):eh
i (t ¡ 1) = 1 o®er deferred payment of w(t)a n d
honor the payment if and only if the worker sets ei (t)=1 : If ®S¤
j · 1 ¡ ± and hj (t ¡ 1) = 0;
hi (t ¡ 1) = 1 and pj (t ¡ 1):e
j
i (t ¡ 1) = 1; then o®er an upfront payment of wc: If ®S¤
j · 1 ¡ ±
and hj (t ¡ 1) = 1; and hi (t ¡ 1) = 0; and pj (t ¡ 1):e
j
i (t ¡ 1) = 1; make no o®er to i.I f
®S¤
j · 1 ¡ ± and hj (t ¡ 1) = 1; and hi (t ¡ 1) = 1; and pj (t ¡ 1):e
j
i (t ¡ 1) = 0; make no o®er
to i.I f®S¤
j > 1 ¡ ± and hj (t ¡ 1) = 0;h i (t ¡ 1) = 1 and pj (t ¡ 1):eh
i (t ¡ 1) = 1; then o®er an
upfront payment of wc; as de¯ned in (18): If ®S¤
j > 1 ¡ ± and not [hj (t ¡ 1) = 0;h i (t ¡ 1) = 1
and pj (t ¡ 1):eh
i (t ¡ 1) = 1]; then make no o®er.
b ¾w
i (t) for individual i - accept any non-negative wage o®er made upfront from a ¯rm j.I f
an up front wage o®er is such that w ¸ wc and hw (t ¡ 1) = 1 and pj (t ¡ 1):e
j
i (t ¡ 1) = 1; then
set ei =1 ; otherwise set ei =0 : If ®S¤
j · 1 ¡ ± and hj (t ¡ 1) = 1; and hi (t ¡ 1) = 1; and
pj (t ¡ 1):e
j
i (t ¡ 1) = 1 accept a promise of deferred payment of w(t)a n ds e tei =1 : Otherwise
accept no o®ers of deferred payment. Terminate any relationship with a ¯rm if deferred payments
are not made, otherwise continue.
This induces an equilibrium in which workers accept a work o®er with deferred payment of
w(t); set ei =1 ; a n d¯ r m sp a yw o r k e r so n l yi fei =1 : In equilibrium, no workers shirk and all
¯rms honor their payment commitments. To see this, note that equilibrium strategies state that
a¯ r mw h oh a sr e n e g e do np a y m e n t s( a n dh e n c eh a dat e r m i n a t i o n )w i l lc o n t i n u et od os o .A n d
note that it is a best response for them to do so. Given this strategy, a worker's best response is
not to trust such deferred payments and to instead work only for payments made up front. Then,
32however, payments satisfying workers' incentive compatibility conditions, wc; will be required to
induce e®ort.
Under b ¾f (t) ¯rms make deferred payments only if the worker contributes correct e®ort in
production. If a worker were not to contribute correct e®ort, the ¯rm knows that under the
worker's equilibrium strategy b ¾w (t), the worker will terminate the relationship at the end of
the period, and the ¯rm will then be punished by other agents, playing b ¾w (t); as they will no
longer accept deferred payments from this ¯rm. However, the ¯rm still ¯nds it optimal not to
pay because, under b ¾w (t); once a worker has not contributed correct e®ort in an earlier period,
the worker will continue to do so. Note also that this is rational for the worker to do, given
that ¯rms are playing b ¾f (t): If a ¯rm itself has lost its reputation, hj (t ¡ 1) = 0; or a ¯rm's
incentive compatibility condition does not hold, (23) fails, then it o®ers wc to workers. Under
b ¾w (t) ,w o r k e r sw i l lw o r ka tt h i sw a g e ,a n dt h i si st h eb e s tt h e¯ r mc a nd os i n c et h es t r a t e g ya l s o
speci¯es that no worker will accept a lower wage and work, or accept a wage as deferred payment.
The other deviations are ruled out by similar reasoning.
6A p p e n d i x B :
6.0.4 Proofs
































































Since, in steady state the ratio wc























































) (1 ¡ ®Sj) ¸ ±;
which rearranges to the expression in the lemma.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Proof: Consider the two sides of equation (32): With g on the horizontal axis, Figure 3
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dg > 0: T h u st h es i g no ft h et e r m ,dRHS
dg ; must equal the sign of
dRHS
d­ : Recall that A and M exceed 1, so it is easy to verify that the term in square brackets <
0 implying that dRHS
d­ > 0 which in turn implies that dRHS





dg2 ; but since d2­
dg2 < 0; the second derivative is also < 0: Thus plotting both sides
of equation (31) together yields two curves (solid lines) of the following generic shapes:
g
Figure 4
Existence and uniqueness of a positive intersection point are thus guaranteed provided RHS >
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Finally the steady state equations are calculated on the assumption that ¯rms' incentive com-
patibility conditions hold. A necessary condition is that, for all m; ®S¤
m · 1 ¡ ±: Since Sm is
34increasing in m; provided this holds for the highest m; it will hold for all lower ones, therefore an
additional necessary condition is: ®S¤
M · 1 ¡ ±: ¤
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1
Consider again both sides of equation (32) that implicitly de¯nes the growth rate. The LHS is
clearly independent of ®. For existence of a steady state, the previous proof showed that the RHS
must exceed 0. Recall that the ¯rst term on the RHS >0w h i l et h es e c o n d<0. Thus an implication
of existence is that the absolute value of the ¯rst term must exceed the second. By inspection, note
that the ¯rst term is proportionally increasing in ®: The second term is, however, inreasing less






























A: Thus, since existence implies the positive term exceeds the negative
term and the positive term increases proportionately with ® whereas the negative term falls less
than proportionately, the RHS is increasing in ®: For given g; then, the RHS expression is higher,
as depicted by the dashed line in Figure 4, so that, necessarily, the new intersection is at a higher
g. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
From Corollary (1) the economy's growth rate increases in ®: From (28) ; this requires that
Sm increases in all sectors. Since Sm is endogenous, we specify Sm (®)t od e n o t et h ev a l u eo fSm
under a given value of ®: There must therefore exist a critical level of ®, solving:
®SM (®)=1¡ ±:
Denote this critical value ®0
M: This is the value of ® such that, for ® = ®0
M condition (22) just
holds in sector M: For ®>® 0
M; (22) can no longer hold in sector M, so that internal labor
markets cannot solve the moral hazard problem there. Steady state condition (VI) cannot be
satis¯ed: Notice that, from (27) Sm (®) <S M (®); since °m <° M for all other m 6= M: Thus
(22) continues to hold there. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3














L1° + ­: (35)
For m ¸ m0; (27) does not apply. The wage is now given by the binding incentive compatible
wage, from equation (18): Clearly the wage cannot be below this and still satisfy worker incentive
compatibility in these sectors. The reason the wage cannot be above this is usual one in e±ciency
wage models: Given that not all human capital obtains wc; s i n c es o m ew o r ki nr e s e a r c ha n d
others work in m<m 0 obtaining w; all individuals in m<m 0 would strictly prefer to take a
35j o bt h e r e . I ft h es t e a d ys t a t ew a g ei nm ¸ m0 were to exceed wc workers in the other sectors
could credibly commit to incentive compatible employment at a wage strictly below the steady
state wage, and incumbent monopolists would clearly raise pro¯t by employing them at such
a wage, thus upsetting the equilibrium. The only wage at which such undercutting by outside
workers is not feasible is at wj = wc; for all j ¸ m0: Note that even though the monopolist
must pay the higher wage, wc; to ensure incentive compatibility of their workers, in order to
dissuade entrants using the old technology from stealing their market, they must limit price
taking account of the market clearing wage, w. Since the old technology is worthless and the
previous incumbent disbanded, entrants with free access to that technology will pro¯tably enter




w ; which is
independent of contracts operating at the industry level: This level of per-period pro¯t is already
computed in equation (20). Substituting for wc using (18) and using L1° = Y





















¡ 1 ¡ ½
±2Am¡1°
L° + ­; (36)
where the last equality utilizes the de¯nitions of °m and ­: Note we denote the research labor in
the sectors m ¸ m0 as Sc
m where the c denotes hiring occurs through a \contractor" relationship.
Now consider the labor resource constraint:
PM
m=1 Lm = N¡
PM



















The summation in the numerator of this expression is complicated by the fact that now we have







m where the ¯rst summation uses (35) and the second must
use (36):












±2Am¡1° L° + ­
¸




























: Notice that, when m0 = M +1; that is when all sectors can
hire through an internal labor market, this expression reduces to (30):
Now consider the growth equation, equation (28) which must also now be split up between
















m=1 Sm((lnA)m ¡ lnA +l n°)+®
PM
m=m0 Sc
m ((lnA)m ¡ lnA +l n°)






Am¡1° L1° + ­
´
((lnA)m ¡ lnA +l n°)
= ®
Pm0¡1







((lnA)m ¡ lnA +l n°)





















(A ¡ 1) + (lnA)A2¡m0
(A(m0 ¡ 1) + 2 ¡ m0)
(A ¡ 1)
2 (38)






±2Am¡1° L° + ­
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((lnA)m ¡ lnA +l n°)=
®
PM










































Combining the two parts (38) and (39) yields the analgous expression to (32) but for the case
when sectors m0 and beyond must hire contractors:


























2 (m0 ¡ (M +1 ) )¡ 1
2
³
m02 ¡ (M +1 )
2
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: This is more
complicated than (32) due to the terms involving m0. Note that when m0 = M +1 ; (when all
sectors hire on an internal labor market) the expression simply reduces to (32):
37Unlike the case for (32) it is not possible to compute the sign of the slope of the RHS function
with g unambiguously. However, existence can still be proved by noting that the g terms only enter
RHS through ­ once again: Thus, the sign of the derivative dRHS
dg = dRHS
d­ since d­
dg > 0: Recall
also that d2­




dg2 ; which is
therefore opposite in sign to dRHS
dg : The ¯rst derivative thus always has opposite sign to the second
derivative. We thus either have: (1) dRHS
dg > 0a n dd2RHS
dg2 < 0o r( 2 ) : dRHS
dg < 0a n dd2RHS
dg2 > 0:
Therefore, given that the LHS is a 45 degree line through the origin, a su±cient condition for
both existence and uniqueness is that, for g =0 ,RHS > 0: To see this, consider Figure 5 below.
The RHS is represented by one of the two curved lines. The upper one corresponding to situation
(1) and the lower to situation (2). Even though we do not know which one holds, in either case,
a crossing point is assured provided that the point at which RHS meets the y axis exceeds zero.
Moreover the crossing points are unique, from the fact that the sign of the ¯rst derivative, in
either case, does not change.
g
Figure 5
A su±cient condition for the RHS>0w h e ng =0i st h a tS1 computed using (36) exceeds 0.
This implies that existence is ensured for any m since Sm for m>1 will strictly exceed S1: A


























Since the last term is negative, the simpler condition in the statement of the Proposition is
su±cient to ensure this.
Finally, note that the worker's incentive compatibility condition (18) is satis¯ed by construc-
tion and has been used in computing (20) and thus in (36); so this holds immediately provided
(33) is satis¯ed. Thus, all that is required is for the ¯rms' incentive compatibility conditions to
hold in sectors m<m 0; as stated in the proposition.¤
38P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
We consider the e®ect of an arbitrarily small increase in ® starting from a point at which (34)
holds with equality. Such an increase in ® will imply that m0 necessarily falls. The proof here
establishes that, as m0 falls, g necessarily also falls. The variable m0 is integer valued, but nothing
in the existence equation, equation (40) requires this, so that here we establish that g falls for
ac o n t i n u o u sd e c l i n ei nm0. To obtain the discrete version we can integrate over the continuous
changes considered here, which, since all of the same sign, will yield a continuous change of the



























































Substituting in for L1; the right hand side then becomes a function of ­;m 0 and exogenous
parameters where g enters only through the term ­: Now consider the right hand side as m0
increases. This corresponds to an increase in the number of sectors that can hire using internal
labor markets. We show that this derivative dRHS
dm0 > 0 which implies that, since the LHS is
independent of m0; the steady state level of g increases with m0: Since m0 enters both through
L1 and directly into RHS, this derivative is complicated but straightforward, though tedious, to



























































In signing these expressions recall that, M>1;A>1; (1 + ½) >± 2: Consider the last two terms,
t h e s er e d u c et o :







: Provided that m0 ¸
2 this exceeds 0 since then, always, (lnA)(A(m0 ¡ 1) + 2 ¡ m0) ¡ (A ¡ 1) > 0:







2 (°M (¡2ln° +l nA ¡ M lnA)):
Since the ¯rst bracketed expression < 0a n d ,s i n c eM>1; the second is < 0, this ¯rst term
is positive. From now on denote this ¯rst bracketed expression by (¡ve); since the same term
























A1¡M (1 ¡ M + AM)+A2¡m0










±2 ¡ (1 + ½)
¢
+( A ¡ 1)
¡
(1 + ½)A1¡M ¡ A±2¢i
:









±2 ¡ (1 + ½)
¢
+( A ¡ 1)
¡
(1 + ½)A1¡M ¡ A1¡M±2¢











±2 ¡ (1 + ½)
¢













(A(1 ¡ m0) ¡ 2+m0) ¡ ±2A + A1¡M (1 + ½)(1+AM ¡ M)
i
:
Add and subtract ¡±2A1¡M (1 + AM ¡ M) yielding:
A2¡m0 ¡
1+½ ¡ ±2¢
(A(1 ¡ m0) ¡ 2+m0)+A1¡M ¡
1+½ ¡ ±2¢




(A(1 ¡ m0) ¡ 2+m0)+A1¡M ¡
1+½ ¡ ±2¢
(1 + AM ¡ M)¡±2 £
A ¡ A1¡M (1 + AM ¡ M)
¤
:




(A(1 ¡ m0) ¡ 2+m0)+A1¡M (1 + AM ¡ M)
i
:
For m0 = M +1t h i se q u a l sz e r o ,f o rm0 = 1 this equals ¡A + A1¡M (1 + AM ¡ M)w h i c hi s
always less than zero, it is straightforward to verify this is true for values between these extremes
too, so that expression is less than or equal to zero for all values of m0:
The ¯nal term is ¡±2 £
A ¡ A1¡M (1 + AM ¡ M)
¤
; which, for the same reason, is also less than
or equal to zero.
Thus, since the overall sign of the square bracket is negative, the whole expression is positive.
An increase in m0 increases the RHS. Since the LHS is unchanged, growth unambiguously rises
as m0 increases. Since the e®ect of increasing ® is for m0 to fall, g falls. ¤
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